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NOTE
INTER NA TIONAL PRIMA TE PR OTECTION
LEAGUE v. INSTITUTE FOR BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH: THE STANDING OF
ANIMAL PROTECTION
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE ANIMAL
WELFARE ACT
The use of animals in medical research has been a subject of controversy
for many years. Both the use of animals in research and the pain inflicted on
them in the name of science are coming under increasing scrutiny with the
development of an active movement seeking the recognition of animal
rights.' In attempts to ensure adequate protection for animals in the labora-
tory, several animal rights advocates have argued that giving animals or
animal protection organizations standing to sue would allow concerned per-
sons and groups to protect the rights of animals.2 Some organizations are
attempting to enforce the federal Animal Welfare Act3 ("AWA") to protect
laboratory animals by suing on behalf of the animals or as a representative of
the animal protection organization.4
In various court decisions, environmental and animal protection organiza-
tions have been granted standing to sue under federal statutes such as the
Marine Mammal Protection Act5 ("MMPA"), the Administrative Proce-
dure Act,6 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969" to protect
the environment and animals.' The trend of cases arising under these stat-
1. Comment: Creating a private cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134
U. Pa. L. Rev. (1986).
2. Dichter, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and Animal Rights, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
147, 160 (1978).
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2151 (1985).
4. International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, 799
F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624 (1987).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1985).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1985).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4331 (1985).
8. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps,
561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 109 (1977); Humane Society of Rochester and
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utes authorizing judicial review of federal agency action has been toward,
recognizing injuries other than economic harm as sufficient to bring a person
within the meaning of the statutory language, and "toward disregarding the
notion that an injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury suffi-
cient to provide basis for judicial review." 9 This development was noted in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp'o in which
the Supreme Court stated that an interest alleged to have been injured may
"reflect aesthetic, conservational and recreational" as well as economic val-
ues." This development, further, illustrates judicial support for broadening
the concept of standing.
The courts, however, have not resolved the question of whether animal
rights organizations have standing to sue under AWA to protect animals
used in medical research or whether a private cause of action could be im-
plied under the AWA. Recently in International Primate Protection League
v. Institute for Behavioral Research,' 2 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit confronted this problem. Although many courts are will-
ing to protect animals by extending standing to include protective organiza-
tions, the court refused to allow this judicial expansion of standing to
interfere with the use of animals in medical research under the AWA. 3 The
court found that the animal protection organization lacked standing to chal-
lenge a medical researcher's compliance with the AWA. 4 The court further
concluded that the implicated federal statute does not authorize a right to
seek relief and that to imply a cause of action in the plaintiffs may entail
serious consequences.' 5
This note discusses the three primary approaches of liberalized standing
accepted by various federal courts in prior cases. The note then analyzes the
decision in International Primate Protection League 6 and discusses why the
court is unwilling to accept a liberalized approach to traditional standing
when it involves animal rights with regard to medical research.
EXPANSION OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF STANDING
In order to bring an action in a federal or state court, a plaintiff must have
Monroe City v. Lyng, 533 F. Supp. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); American Horse Protection Ass'n
v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206 (D.Nev. 1975).
9. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738.
10. 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
11. Id.
12. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d 934.
13. Id. at 938.
14. Id. at 935.
15. Id. at 938-40.
16. Id. at 934.
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standing to sue. Standing has been defined by the United States Supreme
Court as a two prong test that requires a showing of actual injury and a
showing that the interest which is being protected is an interest protected by
state or federal law.17 The requirements of traditional standing have been
relaxed in recent cases involving animal and environmental protection is-
sues. Prior courts have been willing to accept a liberal interpretation of the
standing requirements by accepting a slight private injury as fulfilling the
actual injury requirement.1 8 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada in American Horse Protection Association, Inc. v. Frizzell,'9
has specifically advocated this liberal approach to standing. The case in-
volved a non-profit organization seeking an injunction against the state and
federal government to stop an improper round-up and destruction of wild
horses.2° The court determined that the plaintiff had met the requirement of
injury in fact where the member of the association alleged that he at one
time viewed the wild horses that were to be destroyed and that he desired to
continue to view them.2' The court stated that the injury in fact require-
ment can be met by alleging that members of some group suffer an actual
injury, and the injury can be to aesthetic or environmental values.2 2 The
court further reasoned that it will find that standing exists where such an
injury is alleged, despite an attenuated line of causation from the agency
action to the injury and whether or not the plaintiff will ultimately be able to
prove that he has in fact suffered the alleged injury.23 The strong dissent in
Sierra Club v. Morton 24 indicates growing judicial support of this approach.
This suit unsuccessfully sought an injunction to restrain federal officials from
approving an extensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the
Sequoia National Forest.25 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun advocated an
17. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53; See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
18. See Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669; Animal Wel-
fare Inst., 561 F.2d 1002; American Horse Protection Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1206.
19. American Horse Protection Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. at 1214-15.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1214.
22. Id.
23. Id. This same approach was accepted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia which gave standing to an animal protection organization. This organi-
zation sued the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce the Marine Mammal Protection Act to
protect baby seals that were killed for their fur skins. The court accepted the impairment of the
plaintiff members to see, photograph and enjoy South African Cape fur seals alive in their
natural habitat as an actual injury in fact. The court stated that the plaintiffs were not re-
quired to prove that no contingency might prevent them from viewing the seals in the future
and, therefore, that their allegation was sufficient. Animal Welfare Inst., 561 F.2d at 1008.
24. 405 U.S. 727, 755 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The vote dismissing the case due
to lack of standing was four to three.
25. Id. at 727.
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"expansion of our traditional concepts of standing in order to enable an or-
ganization such as the Sierra Club, possessed, as it is, of pertinent, bona fide,
and well-recognized attributes and purposes" in this area of law to litigate
the issues.26
Some courts have specifically recognized standing for animal protective
societies.27 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps28 held that an organization had stand-
ing to bring suit under the MMPA because there is a firm statutory founda-
tion.29  This case involved an environmental and animal protection
organization challenging a decision by the government to waive a morato-
rium imposed by the MMPA so as to prevent importation of baby fur seal
skins into the United States from South Africa.3" The court noted that the
MMPA is an unusual statute because its primary purpose is to promote the
protection of animals.3 The MMPA was enacted in response to a public
outcry against the commercial exploitation of very young and still nursing
marine mammals, particularly seals.32 The court stated that "where an act
is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness toward animals who
are uniquely incapable of defending their own interests in court, it strikes us
as eminently logical to allow groups specifically concerned with animal wel-
fare to invoke the aid of the courts in enforcing the statute.
33
Several animal rights advocates have argued that giving animals standing
to sue would allow concerned persons and organizations to protect the rights
of animals in court.34 In his dissent in Sierra Club,35 Justice Douglas stated
that the question of standing would be simplified and put into focus if there
were a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before
federal courts "in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled,
defaced, or invaded.. .and where injury is the subject of public outrage. 36
26. Id. at 757.
27. See Animal Welfare Inst., 561 F.2d 1002; Commission for Humane Legislation v.
Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Comment, Recent Developments Con-
cerning the Use of Animals in Medical Research, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 109 (1983).
28. Animal Welfare Inst., 561 F.2d 1002.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1007.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court determined that the appellant's claim of standing has a firm statutory
foundation. However, even if the statute did not provide the answer, the appellants also satisfy
the prerequisites for standing in the absence of the statutory grant. Id. at 1006. See supra note
23.
34. Comment, supra note 27, at 125.
35. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
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Justice Douglas supported this approach by stating that if corporations and
ships have standing to sue then "[s]o it should be as respects valleys, alpine
meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swamp-
land, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modem technology
and modem life."37 A logical extension of this theory would apply to ani-
mals as well as inanimate objects.
Although the trend of cases arising under the various acts authorizing
judicial review of federal agency action has been toward expanding the tradi-
tional concepts of standing to enable protective societies to litigate the issues,
the courts had not before 1986 addressed this issue in regard to the use of
animals in medical research under the AWA. This specific issue was ad-
dressed in International Primate Protection League.38
A RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO STANDING
The International Primate Protection League39 case originated from Taub
v. State.4 The principal complainant, Alex Pacheco, first met the principal
defendant, Dr. Taub, in 1981 when he offered to work as a volunteer for Dr.
Taub on a neurological study at an Institute of Behavioral Research ("IBR")
facility.41 Dr. Taub was studying the capacity of monkeys to learn to use an
arm after the nerves from the arm to the spinal column had been severed.
The project amplified Taub's earlier research in this area and attempted to
discover benefits for the rehabilitation of human patients suffering from a
serious neurological injury, such as a stroke.42 As Pacheco worked regularly
in the laboratory during the summer of 1981, he concluded that the IBR did
not provide the monkeys with sufficient food or water, a sanitary environ-
ment or adequate veterinary care.43 Pacheco brought researchers and pri-
matologists to the IBR to confirm his impressions and collected affidavits
from these visits.44 Pacheco then contacted the local authorities who con-
ducted an investigation and executed a search warrant removing the
monkeys from the facility in the process.45
37. Id. at 743.
38. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d 934.
39. Id.
40. 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983).
41. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 935-36.
42. Id at 936.
43. Id.
44. Iat
45. Id. Dr. Taub was convicted on six counts of violating the state animal cruelty act.
Dr. Taub appealed this conviction to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County where after a
new trial, a jury returned a verdict against him on one count of cruelty to animals. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland then granted a writ of certiorari and in August of 1983 reversed the
1988]
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Animal protection organizations, fearful that the animals would be re-
turned to the IBR, filed a bill of complaint in which they purported to speak
for "their own and class interests and as next friends of seventeen non-
human primates."'4 6 The complaint alleged violations of the state animal
cruelty act that the criminal trial had not established4 7 and further alleged
that the defendant had violated the AWA.4 8
This case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Maryland because the claim arose under the AWA, which sup-
ports federal jurisdiction.4 9 The district court dismissed the case because the
animal rights organizations lacked standing to bring suit against IBR and
the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") under AWA. 5° When the case
reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the court
held that animal protection organizations lacked standing to sue under the
AWA because they could not allege cognizable injuries, and failed to prove
that the implicated federal statute authorized their right to seek relief."1
Considering previous case law, the court acknowledged the traditional,
two prong requirement of standing as defined in Data Processing,5 2 and sub-
sequently used in numerous cases to establish standing for animal protection
organizations.5 3 In International Primate Protection League,5 4 the court
strictly interpreted the two standing requirements. Unlike the previous
cases, the court closely examined each allegation of financial and non-finan-
cial injury to conclude that these claims do not provide standing under AWA
for animal protection organizations. 55 The plaintiffs sought standing by stat-
ing that their members have a personal interest in the preservation and en-
couragement of civilized and humane treatment of animals and that their
own aesthetic, conservational and environmental interests are specifically of-
fended by the matters described and these interests, along with the educa-
conviction by holding that the state animal anticruelty law did not apply to an institution
conducting medical research pursuant to a federal program. Taub, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819
(1983).
46. International Primate Proteciton League, 799 F.2d at 936.
47. See supra note 45.
48. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 936.
49. The issue in controversy arises under the Animal Welfare Act, a law of the United
States. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1987).
50. International Primate Protection Leagug, 799 F.2d 937.
51. Id. at 938.
52. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
53. Animal Welfare Inst., 561 F.2d at 1002; American Horse Protection Ass'n, 403 F.
Supp. 1206.
54. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 934.
55. Id. at 937-38.
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tional interests, will be detrimentally impacted upon if the relief sought is
not granted.5 6 The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the disruption of their
personal relationships with the monkeys by their return to IBR was an ac-
tual, non-financial injury.57 This is almost identical to the argument in
American Horse Protection Association 58 and Animal Welfare Institute,59 in
which the courts found an actual injury to exist where a member of the
organization claimed to have viewed the animals and wished to continue to
view them."° However, the court in International Primate Protection League
held that the above analogy fails because the plaintiffs would have been un-
able to see the monkeys "if the defendants had satisfied all requirements of
care." 6 ' The court determined that the "injury is abstract at best and insuffi-
cient to remove them from the category of concerned bystander."62 The
court further stated that "[t]he commitment of an organization may enhance
its legislative access; but it does not, by itself, provide entry to a federal
court.
6 3
Furthermore, the court stated that "not only do [the] plaintiffs fail to al-
lege [a] cognizable injury, [but also] fail to prove that the implicated federal
statute authorizes their right to seek relief '" Unlike the prior cases, the
court, rather than accepting the stated general purpose of the statute, in-
quired deeply into its legislative history to determine that to according the
plaintiffs standing under the AWA to sue by virtue of a private cause of ac-
tion would not conform to the aims of Congress.65
In International Primate Protection League, the court did not grant stand-
ing under a liberalized interpretation of the traditional requirements or im-
ply a cause of action under AWA for two primary reasons. First the court
acknowledged previous court decisions that have granted animal protective
organizations standing. 66 However, the court also recognized the impor-
tance of medical research by restating the Congressional finding that:
[r]esearch with primates helped to lead to the development of the
polio vaccine, and other animal research has contributed to the dis-
covery of insulin, the invention of transplant techniques, and the
56. Id. at 938.
57. Id. at 4.
58. American Horse Protection Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. at 1214.
59. Animal Welfare Inst., 561 F.2d at 1008.
60. See supra notes 21 & 18.




65. Id. at 940.
66. Id.
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improvement of cancer therapies, [and that] the use of animals is
instrumental in certain research and education for advancing
knowledge of cures and treatments for diseases and injuries which
afflict both humans and animals.67
An article in the New England Journal of Medicine advocating the use of
animals in medical research stated that "[e]very disease eliminated, every
vaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical proce-
dure invented, every prosthetic device implanted - indeed, virtually every
modem medical therapy is due, in part or in whole, to experimentation using
animals.",6 ' These new advances in medicine must sooner or later be tried on
a living being for the first time.69 That trial will be .an experiment, and the
subject of that experiment, if it is not an animal, will be a human being.7°
Therefore, prohibiting the use of live animals in biomedical research or
sharply restricting it, will result in either a blockage of much valuable re-
search or it will result in the replacement of animal subjects with human
subjects.71
The court further emphasized the importance of medical research by sug-
gesting what consequences may flow from an implied cause of action.72 Spe-
cifically, the court feared that such an action would open the use of animals
in biomedical research to the hazards and vicissitudes of courtroom litiga-
tion, draw judges into the supervision and regulation of laboratory research,
and unleash a spate of private lawsuits that would impede advances made by
medical science in the alleviation of human suffering.73
Secondly, the court refused to imply a cause of action under the AWA
because it determined that in the absence of clear direction from Congress
risking such severe consequences would be ill-advised. 74 The AWA seeks to
ensure that "animals intended for the use in research facilities are provided
with humane care and treatment."' 75 However, there was no indication that
67. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1676, 2518. Cancer, the second leading cause of death, has been cured in some
cases by chemotherapeutic agents, which were tested for toxicity in animals. Coronary bypass
operations, which are performed approximately 50,000 times a year, could not have been de-
veloped without the use of animals for experimental purposes. HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, HUMANE CARE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTITUTES FOR ANIMALS IN
RESEARCH ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 777, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982).





72. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 940.
73. Id. at 935.
74. Id.
75. 7 U.S.C. § 131(1) (West Supp. 1987).
Animal Welfare Act
Congress intended this goal to be achieved at the expense of progress in
medical research and science. 76 The statutory design of the AWA is incon-
sistent with the private right of action that plaintiffs assert. The AWA di-
rected the Secretary of Agriculture to "promulgate standards to govern the
humane handling, care, treatment and transportation of animals, but [specif-
ically] cautions that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the Secretary to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to
design, outlines, guidelines or performance of actual research or experimen-
tation by a research facility as determined by such research facility."77 "The
Secretary may also remove an animal found to be suffering through non-
compliance of a laboratory, with the regulations, but only if the animal is no
longer required by the research facility to carry out the research, test or
experiment for which such animal is being utilized."78
The court noted that a review of AWA reveals a congressional "commit-
ment to administrative supervision of animal welfare ... and the subordina-
tion of such supervision to the continued independence of the research
scientists."7 9 The court specifically acknowledged that the "Secretary's
rulemaking authority does not extend to the design of experiments; ... and
the enforcement authority does not extend to the confiscation of animals in
use."" ° In the words of Congress, "under this bill the research scientist still
holds the key to the laboratory door."'" Because of this extensive history,
the court in International Primate Protection League was convinced that
Congress intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive, and that to
accord standing to sue by virtue of a private cause of action would not con-
form to the aims of Congress in AWA.
8 2
CONCLUSION
On April 6, 1987, the Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment.
Thus, International Primate Protection League will have a major effect on
the approaches animal protection organizations use when seeking to protect
laboratory animals. It suggests that the role the judiciary will play in the
vital area of medical research will be that of not going beyond what the
legislature intended. Although this decision prevents animal protection or-
76. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 939.
77. 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (West Supp. 1987).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (West Supp. 1987).
79. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 939.
80. Id.; 7 U.S.C. §§ 2143, 2146 (West Supp. 1987).
81. H.R. REP. No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NE\VS 5103, 5104.
82. International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 940.
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ganizations from obtaining standing to enforce AWA claims in court, it en-
courages these organizations to seek a legislative change that will address the
problem.
A. Camille Holton
